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Abstract. This essay defines the ontology of mental illness or mental disorder in non-
biomedical terms, as consisting of problematic propositional mental content rather than 
organic brain malfunction.  This allows for a causal theory of mental disorder to be 
located within the parameters of existential difficulties rather than biological pathology, 
and contradicts the argument in defence of the necessity of psychotropic medications for 
the alleviation of mental distress. This in turn supports the argument that mental disorders 
can be treated, if not cured, by means of philosophy. 
Keywords. Philosophical practice, Mental illness, biomedic, psychotropic 
 
Resumen. Este ensayo define la ontología de la enfermedad o desorden mental en 
términos no biomédicos, la cual se funda en contenidos proposicionales mentales antes 
que en una disfunción orgánica del cerebro.  Esto permite localizar a la teoría causalística 
del desorden mental dentro de parámetros de dificultades existenciales antes que dentro de 
los de la patología biológica y contradice el argumento que defiende la necesidad de los 
psicofármacos para el alivio de la tensión mental. Esto apoya el argumento de que los 
desórdenes mentales pueden ser tratados, si bien no curados, a través de la filosofía.  
Palabras clave. Filosofía Aplicada, enfermedad mental, biomédico, psicofármacos.  
 
Twenty-eight year old Byron told me he was presently on medication for 
depression. A psychiatric assessment had indicated that he had bipolar disorder 
or manic depressive illness. He said he was suffering from anxiety, a lack of 
self confidence, and extreme shyness, especially around ‘girls.’ He told me he 
was an only child, and still living at home with his elderly parents, and that he 
was a virgin until about a year ago when he paid to have sex with a prostitute. 
He explained that he had ‘obsessed’ about four different girls in his teen years 
whom he had only watched from afar but never asked out, and that in his early 
twenties he had asked a number of other girls out but he had not shown up for 
any of the dates they had agreed to. He apologized for his various nervous 
ticks, many of which often looked like sexually aggressive gestures. He 
wondered if a philosopher might be more helpful to him than the psychiatrists 
and psychotherapists he had visited in the past. Their main treatment approach 
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had been to put him on a regime of powerful psychotropic medications and 
anti-depressants.1 
It would be impossible for philosophy to be helpful in treating Byron’s, 
or anyone else’s, mental illness if mental illnesses were in fact biological 
diseases or deep neurochemical disorders of the organic brain. But 
philosophy has proven to be very effective in treating mental illnesses. 
How is this possible? 
Since about the middle of the 20th century the biomedical paradigm 
of mental illness has been predominant.  In our modern day Western 
society we have been led to believe that mental illness is the same as 
other physical human afflictions such as diabetes or heart disease, where 
the cause is internal or endogenous, due to a dysfunction of the 
biochemical mechanisms of the body itself. We have been told by 
professionals in the mental health care fields, and by professors in the 
universities, that a problem in the mind is like a disease such as influenza: 
mental illness is the cause of this or that type of suffering and distress. If 
this were true then philosophy would clearly not be very helpful in 
treating mental illnesses. But none of this is true.    
Philosophy has been used to treat and ‘cure’ scores of diagnosed 
mental illnesses, such as depression, general anxiety disorder, sleep 
disorder, adjustment disorder, obsessive/compulsive disorder, bipolar 
disorder and its less sever manifestations dysthymic and cyclothymic 
disorders, attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), post-traumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD), paranoia, borderline personality disorder, 
undifferentiated schizophrenia, schizophrenia-affective disorder, paranoid 
schizophrenia, and, yes, even demon possession. In the Textbook of 
Anxiety Disorders2 the authors include a chapter on psychotherapy for 
each of the various psychopathologies discussed. The core element of 
psychotherapy is what’s commonly referred to as talk therapy; talk 
therapy is simply philosophy under a different name. Since none of the 
thousands of diagnosed cases that were helped with talk 
therapy/philosophy can simply be dismissed as mistaken diagnoses by 
incompetent practitioners, there must be some sort of problem with the 
                                                          
1This is from an actual case. Byron is not his real name.  
2 Stein, Dan J. and Eric Hollander. Textbook of Anxiety Disorders. Washington: American Psychiatric 
Publishing, 2002.  
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underlying assumptions about what mental illnesses actually are and what 
causes them. In order to locate the cause of a mental illness it must first 





Byron had been led to believe that he was primarily suffering from some sort of 
chemical imbalance in his brain. This was supposedly at the root of his strange 
behaviour. He was also told that many mental disorders were genetic weaknesses. His 
treatment had consisted almost exclusively of medications meant to reduce his 
agitation during his bouts of mania, and at the same time counteract his clinical 
depression when that arose. Byron explained that, unfortunately, the medications did 
not alter his negative opinion of women, nor did they improve his low self-esteem. 
And, while the drugs seemed to calm his disposition somewhat, they failed to 
eliminate his recurring bouts of hopelessness and apprehension. Each of his previous 
therapists had assured him that eventually the ‘correct’ medications would be found 
that would adequately manage the organic nature of his mental disorders. 
 
With his book The Myth of Mental Illness Thomas Szasz3 may not have 
been the first, but he is one of the earliest, and perhaps best known, 
professionals in the field of mental health care who said that the public 
has been duped, that we have been manipulated into believing that mental 
illnesses are scientifically validated bio-medical diseases when in fact 
they are nothing of the sort. Szasz was derided by many of his colleagues 
as a disgruntled psychotherapist who probably had some sort of grudge to 
settle. But in the last half of the twentieth century more and more 
practitioners came forward to agree with Szasz and support his claim that 
mental illnesses are not biological illnesses, that they do not and should 
not have any ontological status in the medical world because they are not 
caused by brain diseases or malfunctions. They are, as Szasz claimed, 
created by the very act of diagnosing and classifying. So, if not actual 
brain diseases or malfunctions, what are mental illnesses, and how 
exactly are they created?  
The mind is not a material object like the brain. It is an abstraction 
consisting of beliefs, values, and assumptions. The brain is not an 
                                                          
3 Szasz, T. S. The Myth of Mental Illness. New York: Hoeber-Harper, 1961. 
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abstraction; it is an organic part of the physical body. Changing one’s 
mind is not the same as changing one’s brain. There is no such thing as 
‘mental content’ defined as something in the mind. The content of the 
brain simply is the mind. The mind consists of the content. The mind is 
propositional, not biological. Mental propositions consist of propositional 
attitudes—such as doubt, belief, desire, value, and assumptions, toward 
propositional content—such as, for example, worthiness and respect. In 
other words, a person’s mind may consist of the doubt that she is worthy 
of love and respect from others; the belief that she is unworthy of love 
and respect; the desire to be loved and respected; the valuing of love and 
respect; and the assumption that she will never be loved and respected. 
Notice that none of this propositional content has any material existence. 
The defining characteristic of the brain is its complex physical structure; 
the defining characteristic of the mind is its complex ‘intentionality’ as 
philosopher of psychology Franz Brentano called it.4 The mental is not a 
material entity, it is always thoughts or attitudes about something.  
Although foetal alcohol syndrome, lime disease, Alzheimer’s, Turret’s, 
syphilitic dementia and other biological disorders affect thinking, they are 
not mental illnesses. Of course, they all interfere with the proper 
functioning of the mechanisms of the brain and prevent what is 
considered ‘normal’ thinking. These biological disorders affect the 
person’s ability to effectively deal with beliefs, values, and assumptions, 
but they are not problems caused by the individual’s beliefs, values, and 
assumptions. This is what differentiates brain diseases from so-called 
mental illnesses. As soon as mental confusion is found to have an organic 
cause it is no longer a mental problem; it is a brain problem. This is the 
point Thomas Szasz and other mental healthcare professionals have been 
making since the 1950’s in response to the drive by psychiatrists to have 
biological psychiatry be the exclusive treatment paradigm in mental 
healthcare. But our society—and our minds—are so saturated with the 
medical/biological model of mental illness that their message has had 
only minor impact. For example, the Consensus statement of the National 
Depressive and Manic-Depressive Association, coauthored by twenty 
prominent psychiatrists, government officials, and mental health 
                                                          
4 Discussed in A Brief Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. Neil Campbell. Orchard Park: 2005. p. 
9. 
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advocates and published in The Journal of the American Medical 
Association, promoted the idea that  
 
people who have depressive symptoms have a disease condition that, like 
untreated physical disorders, requires professional treatment. Untreated cases 
of depression, no less than untreated cancer, pneumonia, or diabetes cases, are 
serious public health problems that must be treated with high doses of 
medication5  
 
Notice the so-called mental illness of depression is said to be like the 
biological diseases of cancer, pneumonia, and diabetes. Similarly, the 
host of a television program on how to overcome mental illness described 
depression and anxiety as signs of “a broken brain.” But the biological 
model of mental illness that is common in Western societies, that ‘mental 
illnesses are brain diseases,’ is due far more to the cultural beliefs than to 
any empirical findings.  
One of the strangest problems that exists, unexplained, within the 
definition of mental illness as organic brain disease is that there are 
significant differences from one culture to the next. This does not occur 
with organic diseases. For example, personality and eating disorders are 
not universal. They are found only in Western societies. And the 
diagnosed symptoms of depression and anxiety are highly varied from 
one culture to another. The recently ‘discovered’ mental illness of sexual 
addiction seems to be located exclusively within the North American 
culture.6 The biological brain is universal, but mental illnesses are not. 
Some mental illnesses are unique to particular cultures; some cultures do 
not recognise the diagnosis of a particular mental illness as legitimate. 
Biological psychiatry ignores cultural differences and isolates behaviours 
and experiences from their context when claiming mental illness as brain 
disorder. 7 If mental illnesses are in fact bodily diseases, why is there 
such extensive ontological relativism? There should not be any.  
                                                          
5 Horwitz. Allan V. Creating Mental Illness. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002. p. 99. 
6 A new television series is being shown in North America titled “Sex Rehab with Dr. Drew.”  Dr. 
Drew Pinsky is a medical doctor who wears a stethoscope around his neck while talking with his 
supposedly sex addicted patients. He announces at the beginning of each episode ot the program that 
sexual addiction is a “disease that is as dangerous as alcohol and drug addiction.”  
7 Ibid. p. 136, 108. 
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 Professor of Psychiatry Dan Stein points out that “there are no fixed 
boundaries between normal variations [in human emotions] and 
psychiatric disorder—rather the latter category reflects cultural and 
historical theories and values.”8 With the recognition of the importance 
of cultural context and social influences in the definition of mental illness 
it becomes clear that these illnesses are aspects of social movements. 
Societies ‘discover’ and allow certain behaviours and experiences to be 
officially classified as mental illness, and then sustain and reinforce them 
by both professional endorsement and public consent. Once a diagnosis 
has been created, it enters academic and professional curricula, specialists 
emerge to treat it, conferences are organized about it, research and 
publications deal with it, and careers are built around it. Interestingly 
patients formulate their symptoms to correspond to it in what is referred 
to as “doctrinal compliance”—patients alter their beliefs about 
themselves and their ‘conditions’ in ways that “conform to the theoretical 
orientations of their psychotherapists.”9  Furthermore, parents demand 
that their children be labeled with it in order to hide their own parenting 
failures.  
The splitting of psychological problems into illness categories is a 
social, not a scientific, endeavor.10 When common professional consent 
declines or a particular diagnosis becomes the target of too much public 
opposition, that mental illness is declassified by the board of 
professionals which produces the classificatory and diagnostic manuals. It 
thereby simply vanishes into thin air. Multiple personality disorder, 
homosexuality, and masturbation, all at one time considered serious 
mental illnesses requiring extensive treatment, have all been voted out of 
the official diagnostic manuals. General anxiety disorder and dysthymia 
are currently under consideration for possible removal, while a variety of 
sexual behaviours, such as cross-dressing are being considered for 
inclusion.  
The diagnosing of certain behaviours and experiences as mental 
illness, or the removal of a mental illness from diagnostic manuals, is 
under continued political disputation. For example, a conservative US 
                                                          
8 Stein, Dan J. Philosophy of Psychopharmacology. New York: Cambridge UP. 2008. p. 53. 
9 Jopling, David A. Talking Cures and Placebo Effects. New York: Oxford UP, 2008. p. 153. 
10 Horwitz. p. 80. 
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group calling itself the “Traditional Values Coalition” has mounted a 
campaign to have homosexuality reinstalled into the diagnostic 
manuals.11 They hope their lobbying will prompt the decision-makers to 
vote homosexuality back into existence as a mental illness. What sort of 
ontological status does a mental illness have which can simply be voted 
into and out of existence? The psychiatric ‘creation’ of mental illnesses, 
because mental illness is based on the dominant social and political 
environment—not to mention a confused and contradictory ontology—
has been and remains deeply problematic.12 
Allan Horowitz is a professor in the Department of Sociology and 
Institute for Health, Healthcare Policy, and Aging Research at Rutgers 
University. His research into the ontology of mental illness has led him to 
conclude that  
 
...the symptoms of most psychological dysfunctions are not direct indicators of 
discrete underlying disease entities. ...Culture, not nature, influence how most 
disorders become real both to the people who suffer from them and to those 
who treat them.”13 
 
Biologic psychiatry makes two critical errors in defining mental illness. 
First, it adopts a realist epistemology concerning mental illness. It 
assumes that the knowledge that is the mind and mental functions are 
reducible to the chemical or electrical operations of the organic brain. 
This reductionist model of the mind is an essential aspect of biological 
thought. The biological model reduces the operation of complex wholes 
to the properties of their individual parts—neurons, ganglia, chemicals, 
and so on. The logic of this realist model reduces mental illnesses to 
disordered molecular or cellular structures in the brain. Realist biological 
models of mental function and mental illness claim that the primary 
causes of mental ‘diseases’ are in genetic and biochemical factors. They 
locate the pathological qualities of psychological conditions in the 
                                                          
11 See the website at http://www.traditionalvalues.org/read/3645/diagnostic-and-statistical-manual-of-
mental-disorders-under-attack-by-lgbt-activists/ 
12 Fulford, Bill, Tim Thornton, and George Graham. Oxford Textbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry. 
Oxford: Oxford UP, 2006. p. 317. 
13 Horwitz. p. 131. 
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material properties of brains, not in the symbolic systems or propositional 
content which constitutes the mind.14  
The second mistake is that biological psychiatry reifies mental illness by 
defining symptom-based diagnoses as ‘quasi-disease’ entities. But 
reifying a diagnosis is committing a category mistake: an epistemic 
problem is defined as faulty biology or chemistry.  
A symptom of mental illness, or even a cluster of symptoms, is not an 
objective natural entity. This would be like saying that a belief  (such as 
that one is unworthy of love and respect) is an organic disease, or that 
values, desires, doubts, and assumptions are some sort of biological 
substances. Realist assumptions are valid in relation to the physical brain 
but not when it comes to propositional attitudes and propositional 
content, such as beliefs, values, desires, doubts, and assumptions, which 
constitute the dynamic subject matter of the mind.  
The ontology of mental illnesses then is founded on two misconceptions: 
that the epistemic content of the mind is physical material not unlike the 
brain, and that the diagnosis of a mental illness is identical to the 
discovery of an organic disease. Neither of these perspectives is justified 
in light of the fact that a mental illness is entered into diagnostic manuals 
and into professional practice, not by empirical biomedical research, but 
by a majority vote of an editorial committee.15 Furthermore, the 
subsequent definition of any new mental illness is squarely based on the 
mistaken assumption of epistemic realism not on biology. Fortunately, in 
recent years the mental healthcare profession has been slowly shifting 
away from the disease model of mental illness due to mounting criticism 
from inside psychotherapy as well as from philosophers outside the field 
of practice. Evidence of this is the fact that the term ‘mental illness’ has 
been replaced by the less biomedical-sounding ‘mental disorder.’ In light 
of this dubious ontology of ‘mental disorders’ what can be made of the 
claims about their causes? 
 
                                                          
14 Ibid. p. 143, 3. 
15 For a discussion on how a collection of symptoms are given the status of a mental illness see 
Psychiatric Diagnosis and Classification.  Mario Maj et al editors.  West Sussex: John Wiley & 
Sons, 2002. 
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Byron said that his psychiatrists, psychotherapists and other mental health care 
professionals had assumed that the cause of his mental disorders was probably 
a neurochemical imbalance in his brain.  
Byron told me how, when he was six years old, his father had punished him for 
being afraid to go to school on the first day by making him kneel on dried 
kernels of corn for several hours. He said his father was very strict, and that he 
spoke mainly in the form of criticisms and insults. He resented his mother for 
being weak and submissive and for not defending him when his father flew 
into dangerous rages against him. He mentioned that his mother found comfort 
in her frequent visits to church, and that his Catholic upbringing had taught 
him women are either mothers or whores. He said he was disgusted by women, 
and yet he adored them. He also told me how his father often made jokes about 
‘dirty’ bodily functions, women’s ‘dirty’ body parts, and Byron’s big nose and 
his painful shyness which would never get him a woman. His father worked as 
a janitor at Byron’s high school. He often made fun of Byron in front of other 
students, and repeatedly reminded him that he was good for nothing.  
Mental health experts had suggested to Byron that the cause of his mental 
disorders was likely to be some sort of genetic predisposition or weakness.  
 
The three main projects in the psychiatric diagnostic manuals are the 
description of mental states and behaviors regarded as symptoms, 
classificatory grouping of those symptoms into syndromes, and the 
diagnosis of mental disorder according to those syndromes. Note the 
difference between diagnostic manuals in the mental healthcare field as 
compared to those in the field of medicine: there is no attempt in the 
diagnostic manuals referred to by mental healthcare practitioners to 
specify a cause for any of the syndromes listed.16 And there is no attempt 
to portray mental disorder in a naturalistic framework. But while this is 
true on the formal level of sanctioned diagnostic manuals, the specialty 
literature of psychotherapy, psychoanalysis, psychology, and counselling 
is replete with naturalistic causal claims. 
The etiology or cause of any classified mental disorder is dependent 
on the actual ontology of that disorder. As explained in the previous 
section, the ontology of mental disorders is a very confusing issue. 
Mental events continue to be described as being the same as biological 
brain events, when in fact they are nothing of the sort. For example, the 
                                                          
16 Bolton, Derek. What is Mental Disorder. Oxford University Press, 2008. p. 34. 
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third chapter in a very recently published book, titled simply Depression, 
is titled “Pathogenesis” which suggests the cause of depression is 
biological pathology or disease.17 But doubts, beliefs, desires, values, and 
assumptions, which are what constitute the mind, are not material entities, 
so mental disorders can clearly not be biological diseases. Since mental 
disorders are not like biological diseases they cannot be caused by the 
same sort of organic causal factors that bring on bodily disorders. The 
mental disorders do not have the same one-to-one cause and effect 
relationships found in biological diseases. Part of the reason for this is the 
indistinct ontology of mental disorders consisting of ambiguously 
clustered symptoms that make it impossible to determine a particular 
cause for any particular disorder.  
The onset of any so-called mental disorder is a process not an event. 
So-called ‘severe,’ ‘serious,’ or ‘clinical’ mental disorders do not appear 
instantaneously; they develop over time. For an individual’s distress to 
develop into what is diagnosed as a ‘serious’ mental disorder at least one 
of two conditions is necessary: either the initiating life situation was 
extremely distressing, or the suffering extended over a prolonged period 
of time. The claim that serious mental disorders must have 
neurobiological cause merely because of their severity ignores the long 
and troubled existential life histories of the patients who have been 
labelled with these ‘clinical’ diagnoses.  
Mental health literature rarely if ever differentiates between simple 
mental distress or suffering and so-called serious mental problems. Yet 
most of the literature critical of psychiatry and psychotherapy, much of it 
written by philosophers, insists that this distinction is crucial because 
serious mental disorders more readily allow or invite naturalistic or 
medical descriptions of (endogenous) brain disorders, while simple 
mental distress is always deemed a reasonable reaction to difficult 
(exogenous) life circumstances. But the definition of those ‘serious’ 
mental disorders is typically based on the fact that some people’s thinking 
is so strange, and the belief that their behaviour is potentially harmful to 
themselves or others that medication is administered. This defines 
‘serious’ mental disorders as ‘those for which medication is typically 
                                                          
17 Lam, Raymond and Hiram Mok. Depression. New York: Oxford UP., 2008. 
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administered.’ This is clearly a case of circular reasoning: medication is 
administered in cases of serious mental disorder, and the definition of 
serious mental disorders are those which are treated with medication.  
Serious mental disorders, when they are not organic brain problems, 
are the result of severe life circumstances rather than organic 
malfunction. Even physical symptoms like hormonal imbalance, 
neurological failure, or abnormal brain activity do not necessarily have 
organic causes; they can be the result of unresolved life difficulties and 
the body’s stress reactions to long-term mental suffering. Conventional 
wisdom acknowledges that schizophrenia is caused by organic brain 
malfunction. But this wide-spread belief is not supported by medical 
evidence. In fact it has long been known that there are always significant 
existential life stressors that have played a major role in causing the onset 
of this disorder. Schizophrenia is typically not diagnosed on the basis of a 
single symptom; it requires multiple symptoms in a complex and 
interrelated pattern. To claim that schizophrenia is caused by a chemical 
imbalance in the brain is a simplistic reductionist error. Research on the 
families of individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia shows that this 
disorder is clearly not endogenous to the patient. Its cause is external to 
the individual, and the result of a stressful social setting, primarily 
troubling and often disturbingly ambiguous18 family dynamics.19 
The case histories of even the most psychotic patients reveal a 
childhood filled with mental and/or physical mistreatment, often the 
consequences of shockingly incompetent parenting practices. These 
detrimental practices may actually be the result of the parents’ best 
intentions, such as when parents drive a son or daughter to excel at 
school, in the arts, or in sports. Blaming adult patients for what has been 
done to them in childhood or in their early adult years, by claiming their 
mental disorders are the result of endogenous or internal biological 
causes, is unjustified and completely inexcusable. It is a case of blaming 
                                                          
18 One of the ‘ambiguous family dynamics’ is the contradictory messages given to a child such as “I 
love you; don’t touch me.” 
19 See Cognitive Therapy of Schizophrenia by David G. Kingdon and Douglas Turkington. New 
York: Guilford, 2005. See also Barham, Peter. Schizophrenia and Human Value. London: Free 
Association, 1993. 
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the victim. But that’s exactly what occurs with the biomedical approach 
to mental disorder. 
In a university-level psychology textbook, in the chapter on 
psychological disorders, the authors list a number of factors that possibly 
contribute to a fictional character’s panic attacks. They suggest that this 
psychopathology may have an organic cause and they list the following 
as possible causes: a brain tumour, endocrine dysfunction, genetic 
tendency, and neurotransmitter imbalance.20 Notice that two of these 
possible causes—brain tumour and endocrine dysfunction—can be 
discovered by means of readily available medical tests, while the other 
two— genetic tendency and neurotransmitter imbalance—can not. These 
last two possible neurobiological causes are merely theoretical 
speculations, but they have gained enormous weight in the field of mental 
healthcare. They are so popular in fact that they have significantly 
overshadowed three other explanatory models: psychodynamic, social-
cognitive, and sociocultural. The neurobiological/medical explanatory 
model of mental disorder, although almost completely theoretical, is now 
the predominant rationalization for the employment of psychoactive 
medications as treatment, not for brain disorders but for problems in the 
beliefs, values, and assumption which constitute the mind. 
During the 1980’s there was strong lobbying to define mental 
disorders, such as schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders, as 
biological diseases generated within the suffering individual. This 
effectively cut the link that had been discovered between disorders in 
children and bad parenting methods and other traumatic childhood 
experiences. When mental disorder was defined as endogenous there was 
no more need to focus on improving parenting skills or creating a more 
child-friendly social environment.  
While parent groups have fought hard to maintain the biomedical 
causal model of the mental disorders in their children in order to avoid 
parental responsibility, advances in the research on the functioning of the 
brain have not led to any significant advances in knowledge about the 
organic causes of mental disorders.21 Contrary to popular belief, there is 
no laboratory evidence that any of the many diagnosed mental disorders 
                                                          
20 Bernstein, Douglas A. et al. Psychology 6th ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2003. p. 560. 
21 Horwitz. p. 156. Italics in the original. 
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has a clearly established biological or organic origin. As the authors of 
the Oxford Textbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry put it, “For all the 
advances in brain sciences since 1969, biochemically based causal 
theories remain promissory.”22  
And yet even those who are opposed to the biomedical paradigm for 
the cause of mental disorders fall into the trap of using inaccurate causal 
language.  For example, in his book Creating Mental Illness, which is 
actually critical of the biomedical view of mental disorder, sociology 
professor Allan Horwitz writes “Depression is perhaps the most 
widespread mental disorder and the cause of an immense amount of 
human suffering.”23 Notice he says that depression is the cause of human 
suffering. But this is not the case at all. Depression simply is human 
suffering; the word ‘depression’ is descriptive or definitional not causal. 
In effect the symptoms cause the diagnosis of depression. The same thing 
is done with the word ‘schizophrenia.’ Any number of books have been 
written about how schizophrenia causes confused thinking, delusions, flat 
emotions, inappropriate laughter, rambling, unfocused speech, and so on. 
But schizophrenia doesn’t cause anything. Confused thinking, delusions, 
flat emotions, inappropriate laughter, rambling and unfocused speech 
simply define schizophrenia. Again, the symptoms cause the diagnosis to 
be made; they cause the patient to be labeled. The American Psychiatric 
Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Illness (DSM) 
lists these symptoms as the features which define the disorder, in a sense 
saying, ‘These problems are what the disorder is.’ This is a very 
important point that most of the professionals working within our mental 
health care system seem to be confused about: Mental disorders are not 
causal; they are always the effect of some other cause. 
A mental disorder is not an organic problem of the material brain.  It is 
a problem within a person’s mental narrative, within the mind’s 
propositional attitudes and content: contradictory beliefs and values, 
misguided assumptions, confused perceptions, and so on. The mental 
disorder that is referred to as depression is the result of painful external 
factors or difficult and confounding life circumstances that result in 
                                                          
22 Fulford, K.W.M., Tim Thornton, and George Graham. Oxford Textbook of Philosophy and 
Psychiatry. New York: Oxford UP, 2006. p. 252 
23 Ibid. p. 96. 
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cognitive distress and emotional suffering: such as, for example, a man’s 
justified but mistaken belief that his wife is being unfaithful. The belief 
may be false but completely justified, based on the knowledge that his 
wife was not at home on a number of evenings and then was not truthful 
about the reason. The cause of the depression is not at all a so-called 
chemical imbalance in the man’s material brain.24 That would be a 
mistaken causal assumption.  But it would also be a mistaken causal 
assumption to say that the man’s depression causes him to have feelings 
of sadness, hopelessness, and low self-esteem. Again, depression doesn’t 
cause anything. The word ‘depression’ is a diagnostic label that always 
only refers to a collection of symptoms that are noticed in, or presented 
by the sufferer.  The patient’s feelings of sadness, hopelessness, and low 
self-esteem cause the diagnosis of depression. 
Below are two diagrams to illustrate the difference between a cause 
and a bundle of symptoms which lead to a diagnosis. The first one shows 
how the effect — influenza — is often mistakenly cited as being the 
cause of the various symptoms. 
 
 
                                                          
24 If the man was happy about his relationship with his wife no one would say his happiness is due to 
a chemical imbalance in his brain. If so then this would imply that a “normal” chemical balance in his 
brain is an absolutely flat emotional state, which is not normal at all on the human level.   
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 Influenza does not cause a headache, fever, and coughing. A virus causes 
those symptoms. The symptoms in combination are labelled ‘influenza’ 
or ‘the flu’. Medication can be given to alleviate the symptoms: the 
headache, fever, and coughing.  But in order to heal the body when a 
harmful virus attacks, medication must be given which fights the virus 
itself and not just the symptoms. Medication that is meant to alleviate the 
symptoms will not necessarily eradicate the actual cause: the virus.  The 
second illustration shows how the effect — depression — is often 
mistakenly cited as being the cause of the various symptoms. 
     
 
 
Depression does not cause sadness, hopelessness, or low self-esteem. Life 
problems, such as the husband’s belief that his wife is cheating on him, 
cause those symptoms which are then labelled ‘depression’. 
Unfortunately, merely stating that mental disorders are themselves not 
causal agents does not explain what it is that in fact causes mental 
disorders. 
Could it be the case that faulty brain chemistry is the cause of severe, 
serious, or ‘clinical’ mental disorders? It is often claimed that clinical 
depression, anxiety, paranoia, schizophrenia, and so on are all caused by 
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some sort of chemical imbalance in the brain. But what is the evidence 
supporting this? The only proof that is offered is the fact that the patient 
is suffering from ‘clinical’ depression, anxiety, paranoia, schizophrenia, 
and so on. Notice the circularity of  this argument: the diagnosis of 
depression proves the existence of faulty brain chemistry, and faulty brain 
chemistry is said to cause the depression. But there is no biomedical 
evidence supporting the claim that a chemical imbalance in the brain is 
the cause of the disorder. The diagnosis itself is the only proof offered in 




Brain chemistry does affect the human emotions, but human thoughts and 
emotions also alter the chemistry of the brain. Because the brain is a 
material organ and part of the physical world it is seen as subject to laws 
of cause and effect rather than social frameworks of motives, actions, 
meanings, values, beliefs, and responsibilities.25 But empirical evidence 
of abnormal brain chemistry must always be considered in the context of 
that individual’s life. Stress, strong emotions, and the long-term ingestion 
of psychotropic medications to treat mental disorders have all been 
shown to cause alterations in both the chemistry of the brain and in the 
actual structures of the brain. Although many current psychology and 
psychiatry texts assure their readers that the predominant cause of mental 
                                                          
25 Horowitz p. 5 
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disorders are chemical imbalances in the brain and structural brain 
abnormalities, there is simply no conclusive biomedical evidence that 
altered brain chemistry and abnormal brain structures are the causes of 
mental disorders. Diagnostic psychiatry is officially agnostic about the 
variety of factors that lead people to develop mental disorders, but the 
medicalized system of classification it uses largely ignores life stressors 
in favour of the unsupported assumption that there are underlying organic 
pathologies.26  
There is a conspicuous lack of any empirical medical evidence in 
support of the biological causal model of mental disorders. Most of the 
categorical disorders in diagnostic psychiatry do not predict the cause, 
course, or treatment of the conditions they are meant to classify. In fact 
the diagnostic manuals are not at all helpful in the search for the causes of 
mental disorders. The criteria that guides the classification of mental 
disorders is not scientific knowledge or empirical research. It’s simply 
“the need to achieve professional consensus… without regard to 
etiology.”27 The assumption is that the cause doesn’t need to be known if 
the treatment is effective. The problem is that while pharmaceutical 
treatments of mental disorders may serve to reduce some symptoms in the 
patient, they do not address the underlying exogenous or external causal 
factors.  
Recently there was much excitement about the use of genetics in 
causal explanations. Genetics was seen as a vindication of the medical 
model. The specificity of genetic claims was believed to be the ‘missing 
link’ that would finalize the universal adoption of  biological causal 
claims for mental disorders. There was a sudden flurry of increasingly 
optimistic published materials during the past twenty years in which the 
cause of mental disorders was reduced to defective genes. But a careful 
study of genetics reveals that genes are not a simple causal factor. Allan 
Horwitz explains it this way: 
 
In contrast to straightforward genetic diseases, the genetics of psychiatric disorders 
are very complicated. They probably stem from several genes, they have high 
prevalence, they may be expressed through many different symptoms, they overlap 
                                                          
26 Ibid. p. 3 
27 Ibid. p. 108, 73. 
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significantly with other disorders, and they are profoundly affected by 
environmental forces. In addition, the symptoms relatives display are often different 
from those of the focal individual...28  
 
Notice the author uses the words “the genetics of psychiatric disorders,” 
and says that they probably “stem from several genes,” clearly indicating 
that the term “psychiatric disorders” is meant to refer to biological 
conditions. This begs the question, are so-called psychiatric disorders 
organic diseases or are they mental disorders? If the latter then are we to 
assume problems in beliefs, values, and assumptions are genetically 
inherited? It is extremely doubtful that any genetic scientist would agree 
to such an assumption. Also, if mental disorders are genetically inherited 
then why is it that the so-called mental disorders of depression and 
anxiety are highly variable across cultures even where genes have crossed 
national boundaries? 
Genetic studies into mental disorders are no longer as prominent as 
they were in the recent past, in part because of the recognition that social 
and familial settings may have a much stronger influence on individuals 
than their genetic inheritance. Neither adoption studies nor twin studies 
into the genetics of mental disorders are as ideal as they are portrayed in 
the scientific, medical, and psychological literature. A multitude of 
variables, problems with designated control groups, as well as small 
sample sizes make any conclusions based on adoption and twin studies 
unreliable. Those who make strong causal claims about a high genetic 
influence in mental disorders fail to acknowledge the non-specific, 
limited, and contextual effects of genes.  
Recent developments in the field of epigenetics have added a whole 
other dimension to the discussion of genes: the fact that genes are 
themselves affected and altered by the environment of their host. In other 
words it has been discovered that the successes, the failures, and the 
suffering in an individual’s life, rather than being caused by their genes, 
actually function as a subtle but substantial gene-altering mechanism. 
Furthermore, claims of so-called genetic weakness as a causal factor have 
proven to be completely unsubstantiated. For example, a meta-analysis of 
research data has shown that there is no laboratory evidence that the 
                                                          
28 Ibid. p. 140. 
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serotonin transporter genotype has anything to do with a genetic 
weakness that increases the risk of depression in either men or women.29 
In fact, more than thirty years of biological research “have not been able 
to identify a specific [genetic] marker for any of the current diagnostic 
categories.”30  
Ironically research has shown that often the ‘cause’ of so-called 
mental disorders is the professional treating the patient, as well as the 
actual diagnosis the practitioner ascribes to the patient. When a person’s 
confused thinking is diagnosed and labelled as a symptom of 
schizophrenia, it is often irrelevant to their care giver that the person’s 
confused thinking is the result of a reaction to severe distress or a coping 
mechanism employed by that individual to deal with difficult life 
circumstances. 
This irony extends to the medical committees that decide which new 
symptom groups to include as ‘newly discovered mental disorders’ in 
their diagnostic manuals. The ‘cause’ of these mental disorders is not just 
a political decision—a committee’s consensus vote. It also depends on 
how many times this previously unknown mental disorder has been 
‘observed’ and diagnosed by practitioners in the field. And the frequency 
of diagnosis depends in large part on how often a new illness has been 
discussed in journals and books, and how much publicity these 
publications, and this new disorder, have received in both academic 
circles, on the Internet, and in the public media. For example, the number 
of individuals diagnosed as having multiple personality disorder grew to 
pandemic proportions when books were written about these unusual 
cases, the books’ authors and their patients were interviewed on 
television, and then movies were made about them. But this ‘mental 
disorder’ never actually existed; it was simply created and promoted by 
over-zealous practitioners and the always eager media. The cause of this 
mental disorder was the distorted perception of those medical 
                                                          
29 Risch, Neil et al.  “Interaction between the Serotonin Transporter Gene (5-HTTLPR), Stressful Life 
Events, and Risk of Depression.” Journal of the American Medical Association.  Vol. 301 No. 23, 
June, 2009. 
30 Maj, Mario et al, eds..Preface. Psychiatric Diagnosis and Classification. West Sussex: John Wiley 
& Sons, 2002. 
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professionals who ‘saw’ the non-existent symptoms in their troubled 
patients.  
Biological psychiatry is based almost exclusively on nothing but 
unsupported  theories about the organic origins of mental disorder. It is 
sometimes claimed that the success of some pharmaceuticals in treating 
the symptoms of mental disorders proves their biological origins. But the 
fact that psychopharmaceuticals benefit individuals who have been 
diagnosed with a mental disorder is not proof that mental disorders are 
actually the result of biological causes. Psychotropic medications work in 
general, not specific, ways. They are not illness-specific but work across 
different conditions.31 For example, anti-anxiety drugs don’t target any 
sort of specific ‘anxiety disorder’ in the brain. They work in the same 
general way to depress the turbulence in the patient’s mind as alcohol 
does.  
A quantity of scotch, like a psychotropic medication, will dull the 
brain of the sufferer to the point where the existential reason for the 
mental distress is simply temporarily forgotten. But forgetting doesn’t 
eliminate the reason for the suffering. That’s why going off medication, 
just like sobering up, returns the suffering. And just like continued use of 
alcohol to dull the brain can lead to alcoholism, continued use of 
medication to treat mental disorder can lead to a chemical dependence 
and addiction. And just like using alcohol can lead to harmful side-effects 
such as sclerosis of the liver and high blood pressure, using psychotropic 
medications can lead to side-effects such as kidney failure and suicidal 
ideation. And furthermore,  just like sobering up includes the suffering of 
a hangover, going off medications includes the suffering of withdrawal 
symptoms.  
Psychotropic medications are known to alleviate some symptoms but 
have not been shown to cure any underlying causes, whether they are in 
fact organic diseases or otherwise. But the proclamation that mental 
disorders are biological has generated a quasi-medical environment that 
has produced the huge profits now being enjoyed by the many, primarily 
North American, pharmaceutical corporations marketing the numerous 
psychotropic medications. 
                                                          
31 Horwitz. p. 113. 
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After half a century of medical research, there is still an embarrassing 
lack of evidence in the form of disease-specific markers for any of the 
currently listed mental disorders. This is not surprising because the 
classification of mental disorders has no basis in medical science; it is 
based on the observation and evaluation of human behaviours, 
experiences, and actions. A person’s behaviours, experiences, and actions 
cannot be characterized or scrutinized independent of an understanding of 
the beliefs, values, assumptions, and intentions underpinning them, or of 
the social settings in which they occur.32 Behaviours, experiences, and 
actions which are diagnosed as being mental disorders are not the 
deterministic performance of a faulty brain; they are the meaningful 
communications of the beliefs, values, assumptions, and intentions of a 
person’s mind.  
Propositional mental content, even that which is considered 
abnormal, cannot be defined in reductionist biological causal terms for 
the simple reason that mental content is often normative and tentative, 
two states that cannot be said to apply to biological causation. In other 
words mental propositions are often beliefs or assumptions about what 
ought to be, and these beliefs can be doubted—even and often within the 
same mind! Normative and tentative language makes no sense when 
applied to biological cause and effect relationships.33 The constellation of 
symptoms that are labeled ‘mental disorders’ are not caused by 
underlying organic disease processes; they come from sociocultural 
influences that structure particular types of thinking, experiences, and 
behaviours into socially appropriate symptoms. The particular ‘disorder’ 
that emerges is not a discrete biological disease; it is a reification of 
observed symptoms, and a reflection of both sociocultural stressors and 
influences. 
Causal factors appear to create general symptoms not specific to 
depression, anxiety, or other common disorders. What continues to hinder 
the ‘discovery’ of causal factors for mental disorders is the fact that one 
set of symptoms can be variously identified and classified as a number of 
                                                          
32 Barham, Peter. p. 87. 
33 For a discussion of normative mental content see the essay “Reductionism/Antireductionism” by 
Tim Thornton in The Philosophy of Psychiatry. Jennifer Radden ed. New York: Oxford UP. 2004. p. 
198. 
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different disorders depending on the interpretive paradigm being 
employed by the diagnostician. In fact there is continual disagreement 
among professionals about which symptoms ought to be listed under 
what mental disorder in the diagnostic manuals. This is why there are 
virtually no specific etiological or causal factors currently listed for any 
particular non-psychotic disorder.34 With this level of professional 
vagueness and ambiguity in the definition of specific mental disorders, 
with such ontological relativism, causal claims simply become 
meaningless if not absurd. 
When talk of biological brain diseases is abandoned, and mental 
disorders are seen as the result of propositional problems, it is easy to see 
how etiological or causal factors might include living in a family with a 
history of variously diagnosed psychiatric disorders, the experience of 
early childhood trauma, troubling life situations, a weak or absent social 
support network, and gender.35 Yes, gender is a causal factor when 
mental disorders are understood to be caused by stressful or traumatic life 
situations such as the suppression of a woman’s rights and freedoms, or 
confusion concerning gender orientation and identity.  
But the current force of the medical/biological model of mental 
disorders is a formidable and enduring barrier to research into their 
cultural, social, and personal origins. The cost of the ascendancy of 
biological psychiatry has been a dismissal of all but biological and 
genetic causal explanations, and a minimizing of the much more 
pervasive sources of individual suffering and distress found in an 
individual’s daily life experiences. Psychiatrists have drifted away from 
discussions about problematic life situations with their patients, and are 
spending their time instead writing prescriptions for powerful brain-
altering medications. It has been left to psychotherapists and counsellors 
to offer non-chemical help to those with troubled minds.  
 
 
                                                          
34 Horwitz. p. 111. 
35 The ‘diagnosed psychiatric disorders’ are nothing more sinister than the problematic coping 
strategies employed by the members of a dysfunctional family. 
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Byron and I talked a lot about his Catholic childhood and how his family and 
religious upbringing had led him to see the human body as shameful, sexuality 
as dirty, women as evil mainly because they were desirable, masturbation as 
sinful, and himself as loathsome and inferior to everyone else. Of course over 
the course of many sessions I suggested various alternative perspectives on 
these issues including different strategies for envisioning his relationship to 
women, which helped him to change his mental habits to some degree. But 
what helped him the most was the letters I encouraged him to write and ‘send’ 
into the past to his nine year old self. At first he found this assignment very 
difficult, afraid of making a mistake, of not writing a good enough letter, even 
of being ashamed of having the nine year old ‘see’ how pathetic he now was. 
But little by little he found that writing these letters gave him a sense of relief 
and reassurance. They allowed him to show love and affection for a little boy 
who had rarely experienced anything but disapproval and condemnation. He 
felt he was rescuing a boy whose world had abandoned him. This imaginary 
connection to his own painful past served to boost Byron’s self esteem and self 
confidence to the point where he allowed me to invite a female colleague to 
join our discussions. Her gentleness, understanding, and patience, helped 
Byron to reformulate his beliefs and assumptions about himself and about 
women, and to accept his desires as a normal part of being human. After a 
number of sessions Byron informed me that his medical doctor told him he 
seemed to be undergoing a remarkable recovery. This prompted the doctor to 
take him off all his medications except the mildest anti-depressant which 
Byron was allowed to take at his own discretion…. 
 
The practice of conceptualizing mental distress as diseases or illness, and 
diagnosing it as mental disorder has raised a number of serious problems 
in society. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Illness 
(DSM) system of classification includes all behaviours and experiences 
clinicians encounter in their present practices. This means that for the 
members of the board who determine which mental disorders to add or 
remove from the book,  
 
problems of ordinary life such as dealing with troublesome children and 
spouses, poor marriages, frustrations in careers, personal identity crises, and 
general unhappiness had to be reconceptualized as discrete forms of individual 
pathology.... Chronic dissatisfaction with life could be renamed ‘dysthymia’; 
the distress arising from problems with spouses or lovers could be called 
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‘major depression’; the disturbances of troublesome children could be 
renamed as conduct, personality, or attention deficit disorders. ...In the 
absence of a valid definition of mental disorder, there is no limit to the number 
of discrete conditions researchers and clinicians can develop36 
 
While it is argued that a mental disorder is like a physical illness, a 
mental disorder is not kept to the same diagnostic guidelines as a physical 
illness. A mental disorder such as depression is defined much more 
broadly than a condition like, for example, diabetes. The diagnosing of 
mental disorders lacks the definitional rigor seen in all other areas of 
medicine and science. The most common mental disorders—depression, 
anxiety, phobias, obsession and compulsion, panic disorders, 
somatizations, and so forth—are not clear and distinct entities. They are 
very difficult to distinguish from one another. So why has the diagnosing 
of mental disorders become so popular among mental heath care 
professionals?  
Diagnostic categories originally emerged in order to raise the prestige 
of psychiatry by ensuring that it would be recognized as being an 
objective scientific and medical discipline. Diagnosing also helped “...to 
guarantee reimbursement from third party health insurance companies, to 
allow medication to be marketed, and to protect the interests of mental 
health researchers and professionals” whose income depended on a 
steady flow of patients for treatment.  But diagnostic models handicap 
rather than help us in understanding both distress that emerges from 
social conditions and deviant behaviour that does not result from 
biological brain dysfunctions.37  
Today more and more therapists and counsellors avoid diagnosing 
and labelling their clients with the specific disorders described in the 
DSM. During the explosive rise in the prescription of psychotropic 
medications in the 1970’s and 80’s, the practitioners of so-called talk 
therapy—dynamic psychiatry and psychotherapy—had recognized and 
dismissed drug treatments as “superficial palliatives.”38 They could see 
that while some of the apparent symptoms of suffering patients were 
reduced with psychotropic medications, the underlying life experiences, 
                                                          
36 Horowitz p. 72 – 74. 
37 Ibid. p. 109, 81, 15. 
38 Ibid. p. 78. 
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which were the real causes of the suffering, were being disregarded. They 
knew that understanding the subjective experience of mental and 
emotional distress was critical to an appropriate treatment modality. In 
1997 a formal dialogue between seven New York psychiatrists and nine 
“consumer-practitioners” criticized the medical model and the current 
quasi-biological diagnostic system as “disempowering and detrimental 
when used to the exclusion of other explanatory frameworks.”39  
The psychiatric classifications of repression, sublimation, projection, 
and so on, have fallen out of favour, as have the supposed existence of an 
unconscious part of the brain that contains unresolved childhood issues 
which were said to control the person almost against his or her will. 
Likewise, the diagnostic logic behind the distinct categorization of so-
called mental disorders has come under significant criticism against 
which its supporters have been unable to mount a defence. On the other 
hand research data has made it increasingly more apparent to mental 
health care practitioners that so-called talk therapy is undeniably effective 
in treating mental disorders. This talk therapy is simply philosophy under 
a different name. 
Philosophy has proven to be an effective means by which to ‘treat’ 
mental disorders because mental disorders are non-biological problems; 
they are disorders of the narrative or propositional content of the mind. 
Philosophy as it is applied to therapy and counselling is based on three 
foundational premises: mental problems are not the same as brain 
problems; a person’s beliefs, values, desires, doubts, and assumptions can 
cause so-called mental problems; and good philosophical discussions can 
alleviate and prevent many of these problems. Mental disorders are 
conflicts, complications, and confusions of beliefs, values, desires, 
doubts, and assumptions. When philosophy is defined as an examination 
of the reasons we have for the values we hold as good and the beliefs we 
hold as true, it leaves no doubt that philosophy is perfectly suited as 
treatment for the more common mental disorders. But philosophy has 
also been demonstrated to alleviate the suffering of those who have been 
diagnosed with so-called ‘serious’ mental disorders that were once 
                                                          
39 Blanch, Andrea et al. “Consumer-Practitioners and Psychiatrists Share Insights About Recovery 
and Coping.” Psychological and Social Aspects of Psychiatric Disability. Roy Spaniol et al eds. 
Boston: Boston University, 1997. p. 71, 69. 
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considered organic brain diseases such as ‘clinical’ depression and 
schizophrenia. When the ontology and etiology of mental disorders is 
properly understood it becomes clear that philosophy may indeed be 
considered a ‘cure’ for mental disorder.  
But it might be argued that psychotherapy, narrowly understood as 
based exclusively on psychology, is the best method to use when trying to 
help those afflicted with professionally diagnosed mental disorders. 
Interestingly, an examination of the description of some of the foremost 
approaches to psychotherapy reveals that they are all already solidly 
based on philosophy. In his book Theory and Practice of Counseling and 
Psychotherapy Gerald Corey, a professor of counselling and licensed 
psychologist, describes them this way: 
 
Psychoanalysis is said to have “touched on philosophy, psychology, 
sociology, art, and literature…”40 Freud and Jung were both thoroughly 
educated in philosophy. 
 
“Existential therapy can best be described as a philosophical approach that 
influences a counsellor’s therapeutic practice.”41  
 
Person-centred therapy is “a humanistic approach that grew out of the 
philosophical background of the existential tradition.”42 
 
Gestalt therapy is “phenomenological as it focuses on the client’s perception 
of reality. The approach is existential in that it is grounded on the here and now 
and emphasizes that each person is responsible for his or her on destiny.” 
 
Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy (CBT) “has always been characterized by 
being highly rational, persuasive, interpretative, directive, and philosophical.” 
Modern day Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy (REBT) is said to 
combine humanistic, philosophical, and behavioural therapy.43 As well as 
being heavily influenced by the ancient philosophy of Stoicism, it owes “a 
philosophical debt” to a number of other sources that have influenced its 
                                                          
40 Meissner, William W. “The Future Role of Psychoanalysis and Psychoanalytic-Oriented Therapy.” 
In The Challenge to Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy. Stephan De Schill and Serge Lebovici eds. 
London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 1999. p. 110. 
41 Corey, Gerald. Theory and Practice of Counseling and Psychotherapy.” 5th ed. Pacific Grove: 
Brooks/Cole Publishing, 1996. p.170. Italics in the original.  
42 Ibid. p. 199. 
43 Ibid. p. 224.  Italics in the original, 318, 317. 
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development such as the philosophical writings of Immanuel Kant, Baruch 
Spinoza, Arthur Schopenhauer, Karl Popper, and Bertrand Russell.44 
 
Reality therapy (RT) is concerned with “teaching people more effective ways 
to deal with the world…. The reality therapist functions as a teacher and a 
model.” 
 
Classical behaviour therapy today goes beyond mere Pavlovian behavioural 
conditioning and deals with a person’s emotions and meaning. 
 
Even a predominantly psychological approach like the Adlerian therapy 
“includes identifying and exploring mistaken goals and faulty assumptions” 
“…it pays attention to the individual way in which people perceive their 
world… how the individual believes life to be.”45  This is undeniably an 
application of philosophical inquiry. 
 
Each of the methods in ‘talk therapy’ is deeply indebted to philosophy. 
None of them resemble anything like a biomedical or pharmaceutical 
approach to organic brain disease, yet all of these ‘talk therapies’ are said 
to be successful in treating individuals suffering from diagnosable mental 
disorders. The reason for the successes of talk therapies lies in the fact 
that they employ philosophical discussions in the treatment of mental 
disorders. Philosophy is more than just a casual discussion of beliefs, 
values, desires, doubts, and assumptions; it is a legitimate approach to the 
treatment of mental disorders properly understood. The use of philosophy 
in talk therapy—philosophical counselling—has proven to be an effective 
treatment and even a ‘cure’ for most of the so-called mental disorders 
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